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ABSTRACT
SERGUEI KOREPIN: The Russians Have Been Listening to Us
(Under the direction of Graeme Robertson.)
This thesis shows that there is a correlation between Russians’ perception of the United
States and their opinion of democracy. Moreover, it shows that Russians’ perception of the
US are, in part, determinative of their opinion of democracy. How and why Russians have
formed an association between the US and democracy is also analyzed. This thesis argues
that this association was formed because of Russians resilient Soviet identity (including
nostalgia), due to social modernization emanating from the US, conditioning via a poor
experience with US-associated democracy in the early 1990s, as well as Kremlin and US
reinforcement of the US=democracy association.
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Introduction
Since early 2014, when the conflict in Ukraine began, the US has given moral
and material support to Ukraine’s new government, and condemned and sanctioned Russia.
Unsurprisingly, Russians’ opinion of the US dramatically fell 2014-2015, what may be
more surprising is that Russians’ opinion of democracy also fell during this period—by 10
percentage points (about 50%) (Levada Center 2015a). I show that this is not a coincidence,
instead, there is an important causal relationship between Russians’ perception of America
and their opinions of democracy.
Public opinion of democracy has been measured extensively, and there are some impor-
tant works on the subject. Perhaps most prominently, Inglhart and Welzel have shown that
modernization is a determinant of “self–expression” values (inclusive of greater desire for
democracy), which lead to democratization. Several others have argued that perception of
corruption, income, and other variables are also important determinants. However, the idea
that perception of the US is causally related to opinion of democracy is new.
Public opinion of democracy is important because it has been shown to directly affect
the probability of establishing and maintaining democracy—it can be thought of as the level
of demand for democracy. The idea that the US is associated with democracy is theoreti-
cally important because it enables us to better address the puzzle of what determines public
opinion about democracy in Russia, and perhaps other places. This idea also has policy
implications—it means that paying more attention to how US actions affect the perception
of America can help the process of democratization.
I begin by using concepts from psychology to explaining how and why Russians asso-
ciate democracy with the United States. I find five reasons: 1. The identity of being a Cold
War rival to a democratic United States is resilient. 2. Increasing social choice often comes
via the spread of US cultural content1 . 3. Russians’ experience with “democracy” in the
early 1990s was to some extent associated with the US. 4. The Kremlin has an incentive
to reinforce the association between America and democratic reforms as long as the US is
viewed negatively. 5. America often explains its foreign policy actions in terms of democ-
racy promotion. I follow this up by using logit regressions to show that various aspects of
Russians’ perception of the US affects their evaluation of democracy.
To be clear, I am not saying that the US is responsible for a lack of democracy in Rus-
sia. Authoritarianism in Russia is mostly a Russian problem. However, I do show that
minding how ordinary Russians perceive US actions and statements affects their evalua-
tions of democracy, which in turn makes it easier (or more difficult), for autocratic elites to
stay in power. This is a new idea and it is important because it adds to our knowledge of
democratization.
Attitudes Toward Democracy
Political scientists have put a great deal of effort toward understanding democra-
tization and finding factors relevant to this process. Many factors have been regressed with
democratic governance as the dependent variable. However, preference for democracy, the
dependent variable I use, is considered less frequently. Perhaps this is because it seems evi-
dent that most people want democracy—as reported by major polling organizations like The
World Values Survey and Pew Polling. However, the percent of people favoring democracy
varies a great deal from country to country. The population’s level of preference for democ-
racy is an important dependent variable because it is directly relevant for democratization;
the idea that the degree of the population’s support for democracy has a causal impact on
establishing and consolidating democratic government has been argued by several political
scientists, and seems uncontested (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Chanley 2000; Kenneth 2001;
1 Modernization is characterized by an increasing number of social choices, and democracy is included in
having more social choice.
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Norris 2002; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999).
People with a lower opinion of democracy are less likely to obtain and sustain democ-
racy for the following intuitive reasons. 1. People who do not support democracy are less
likely to join civil society organizations related to democracy promotion. Beissinger shows
that during the Orange Revolution, the main organizational force in Ukraine was that of
identity, and that two-thirds of Ukrainians were apathetic toward democracy (Beissinger
2013). This has likely hurt Ukraine’s democracy prospects. 2. People not favoring democ-
racy may be more easily manipulated by autocratic elites. In comparison to Eastern Europe,
former Soviet states may have had a lower demand for democracy due to a longer period
indoctrination, which may have contributed to a lower ability of the populace to know just
what should be expected from democracy. 3. While some political opposition groups are
based in ethnicity or religion, a great deal of them push for democracy, and a lower demand
for democracy likely means less of a political opposition. It is doubtless easier for Vladimir
Putin to “win in the streets and in the elections” (Robertson 2011) if there are fewer people
favoring democracy. Similar explanations are given by scholars that argue causality from
support for democracy, to having democracy.
Scholars who have run regression analyses with “approval of democracy” as the de-
pendent variable have often focused on independent variables that measured perceptions of
political performance, corruption, social capital, demographics, and various economic fac-
tors. Several have argued that increased income brings an increased desire for democracy
(Mishler and Rose 2001; Magalhaes 2014; Norris 1999).
Others argued that people’s perception of various economic indicators is important, e.g.
their perception of how the economy is doing, it’s future, or perception of the government’s
economic policies (Sing 2012; Bratton and Mattes 2001; Mishler and Rose 2001; Norris
1999). However, using such independent variables is problematic because of the potential
for endogineity, which these authors do not address; it is plausible (especially in post-
communist states), that one has a poor view of the country’s economic performance because
they prefer a communist planned economy. In fact, Sullivan shows that the strongest aspect
of Soviet nostalgia is a longing for a better welfare state.
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Mishler shows that “realist” measures (e.g. asking people to compare with the past)
are more accurate than “idealist” measures (asking people about an abstract ideal), specif-
ically on the subject of measuring support for democracy (Mishler and Rose 2001). Thus,
like several other authors, I use income as the economic measure, which is more accurate
measure and avoids the problem of endogineity.
One of the most compelling arguments about perception of democracy is put forth by
Inglehart has; that as a society gets wealthier, people transition from “survival values”
to “self–expression” values, which are correlated with a desire for democracy (Inglehart
2003). Rose, and others similarly emphasize the importance of the development of social
capital (Richard Rose and Haerpfer 1998). Education and Urbanity are also often measured,
and can be thought of as part of modernization. Age too has been shown to matter, due to
people being socialized at different political eras.
Some scholars have also argued that support for democracy (especially once estab-
lished) is largely due to people valuing political freedoms, and that the government’s eco-
nomic performance is of lesser importance (Yun-han Chu and Tessler 2008; Evans and
Whitefield 1995)2 . Magalhaes, using over 100 surveys, shows that government effec-
tiveness, defined as policy making formulation and implementation, is most determinative
of support for democracy (Magalhaes 2014). In his study of African states, Bratton also
shows that democracy is valued as an instrument—that while people evaluate the govern-
ment based on economic performance, they value the guarantees of political rights more
than economic performance (Bratton and Mattes 2001). Interestingly, Sing finds that in
three democratic states in East Asia, people support democracy largely based on political
performance, e.g. support for human rights. However, people in three autocratic East Asian
states value democracy more based on economic performance (Sing 2012).
Other variables that have been shown to be important are perception of democracy—this
can be important to determine whether the person has a similar understanding of democracy
2 This is not mutually exclusive with the idea that more wealth leads directly or indirectly to a greater
desire for democracy.
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as most political scientists3 . Chu finds Political Trust and Free and Fair Elections statisti-
cally significant (Yun-han Chu and Tessler 2008). Another important factor is corruption—
Maghalaes has shown that the more corruption there is, the less people approve of the type
of government under which they live. Several authors included a stand-in measure for cor-
ruption, like “Trust in Government Institutions” (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Yun-han Chu
and Tessler 2008; Evans and Whitefield 1995), or corruption perception (Mishler and Rose
2001; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1999; Richard Rose and Haerpfer 1998). An argument
from Acemoglu and Robinson also fits this idea: extractive economic institution lead to
relative poverty among the majority of the population and are accompanied by extractive
political institution, i.e. non-democratic institutions. The desire for greater opportunity and
greater material well-being causes people to desire inclusive institutions, i.e. democracy
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
It is also important to note that many scholars have used the psychological mechanism
of association in passing to explain their findings. Mishler notes “Americans do not love
their government because they think it is democratic; they love democracy because they
associate it with the American way of life.” Sing wrote “in Japan, long-time one-party rule
by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party has been associated with political malaise.”
Norris mentions “many people may associate party membership with “party supporters,’ or
even ‘party loyalists.”’ There is an element of making a leap of faith about such claims
of association. Often we are told that a statistical correlation “shows” a psychological
association, but the why and how are not clear. Moreover, authors in the public opinion on
democracy literature have used the term differently—some have used it to refer to a mental
link, others have used it to refer to a social contract, e.g. between people’s support for the
government and the governments economic performance. I will explain briefly explain the
psychological mechanisms behind association and show how and why Russians associate
the US with democracy.
In summary, two aspects of this study are new and different from the preceding liter-
3 Though if most people in a society held the same view, which was different from than of most political
scientists, this would be much less problematic because they would all talking referencing the same term.
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ature. First, I explain how and why people associate democracy with the United States.
Second, I put forth a new idea: that perception of the United States has a causal effect on
support for democracy in Russia.
How and Why Russians Associate America with Democracy
In this section I show how psychological mechanisms of association, conditioning
and resilient ideas, explain Russians’ association of democracy with the US. Specifically,
five factors largely explain the association Russians have between the United States and
democracy: 1. A resilient identity, with the democratic United States as the rival “other,”
partly supported by people’s nostalgia for the USSR. 2. The effects of social modernization
(increasing social choice) often emanating from the US. 3. Operational conditioning via a
painful experience with US-associated “democracy” in the early 1990s. 4. Possible Krem-
lin support for association between the US and democracy—as long as the US is viewed
negatively, it is in their interest to link the US and democracy. 5. The US reputation as a
model and promoter of democracy. I also show how this association facilitates the following
phenomenon: Russians’ perception of the US affecting their opinions of democracy.
In psychology, associations between concepts and/or mental states is considered a fun-
damental part of human development, in fact, memory is a chain of associations, e.g. a
face brings up the associated name (Gazzaniga 2004) or, in a broader context, Cooper
and Ratele note “we often see a conflation [association] of the individual and the collec-
tive in macro-processes such as truth-commissions” (ICP 2014). One type of memory is
“automatic retrieval,” which happens instantly (Gazzaniga 2004), and this is what I argue
happens when some Russians think about the US, democracy is automatically retrieved.
Through automatic retrieval via contiguity (Maher 2014), many people associate Egypt and
pyramids, North Korea and dictatorship, etc. The United States has been the ideological
center of democracy, and its biggest promoter, throughout most of our lives. Thus, through
the process described above, people in some countries associate the United States with
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democracy.
Dupuis-Deri describes a process of such association for Canadians. He notes that the
Canadian Founding Fathers were “anti-democratic” and that the idea of Canada as a democ-
racy was “the result of an official rhetoric seeking to convince Canadian citizens to partici-
pate in two extremely bloody [world] wars” (Dupuis-Deri 2009). He writes that in seeking
support for the wars, the government designated “the Allies with positive images (civiliza-
tion, freedom, Christianity, and lastly, democracy). It was in that way that Canada came to
see itself as being democratic, in the absence of any institutional or constitutional change
whatsoever that might justify this change in designation.” Dupuis-Deri argues “an associa-
tive effect took root in public discourse. It can be summed up by the following circular
formula: Democracy = good = us = Canada, or Canada = us = good = Democracy”(Dupuis-
Deri 2009). He argues that this process, in the first half of the twentieth century, made
“democracy” meaningful for Canadians. A similar process of association has been signif-
icant in other states, specifically “America = [value judgment] = them = democracy.” In
addition, Dupuis-Deri’s inclusion of a value judgment is consistent with the way people
form attitudes (Eagly and Chaiken 1998). In Russia this process was facilitated by five
factors, described below.
Resilient identity and nostalgia
A major component of identity formation, including one’s national identity
(Crescenzi and Enterline 2001)), is defining oneself against an “other” (Wagnsson 2000).
The United States being a long-time rival of Russia, some Russians have used democratic
America as the “other” (Voestermans 1991). An association between the US and democracy
is partly due to this resilient identity, which is supported by nostalgia for the USSR.
Part of the process of making an association can be encouraged, as noted in the Cana-
dian case. Such encouragement can be done through “Classical conditioning,” which is an
example of “associationistic learning.” The most famous example of classical conditioning
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is Pavlov’s Dog, though humans are by no means immune4 . Governments use classical
conditioning by repeating a few simple points to encourage mental associations consistent
with their positions, e.g. the “Better dead, than red” slogan of the “Red Scare” period in
the 1950’s (encouraging an association between communism and evil). Certainly Soviet
propaganda encouraged an association of we=good=communist.
Moreover attitudes and associations tend to be resilient for at least three reasons. First,
in political valuation, like in religion, people use facts to support views that they already
hold (Haidt 2012). Second, media content gets better ratings on stories that are in line
with people’s prior beliefs (for example, about a country), and as a result the media tends
to produce just such stories (Matthew Gentzkow 2006). Third, people tend to base their
opinions on what they believe to be the prevalent opinion of their social group (called “social
desirability”)5 .
In addition to one’s own identity, the view of another’s identity (reputation) is also
thought to be resilient. Crescenzi writes that “interstate rivalry does not turn on and off
discretely; it evolves over time as a function of consistent behavior ... Moreover, a relation-
ship does not cease at the point in time when the final interaction ‘event’ occurs. Rather,
it diminishes gradually with the continued absence of further interaction” (Crescenzi and
Enterline 2001). Thus, Soviet citizen’s view of the US as a rival and democratic “other” to
their own identity is a phenomenon that did not cease in the late 1980’s, nor did it cease
with the end of the Cold War.
Even though Soviet leaders in the late 1980’s were more moving the USSR ideologically
closer to the West, there had been a long period of presenting the US as the ideological
wrong, and this has resiliency. In addition, the US being superpower counterpart, it was
4 At better understanding of conditioning theory has been developed since Ivan Pavlov, e.g. the uncon-
ditioned response is not exactly the same as the conditioned response. However, for the purposes of my
argument the basic definition of classical conditioning is un–problematic as the main, relevant parts of the
theory have not changed. Also, Organization Theory (as opposed to association), states that there is a struc-
ture of memory: remembering one thing, makes you remember a whole series of associated ideas. This is
also not problematic for my argument.
5 In addition, F. H. Bradley argued that association results when a nerve current has once passed by a given
way, and that it will pass more easily by that path in future (Kendler N.d.).
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still the “other” and a danger. There was also resiliency on the US side, which reinforced
Russians’ views: President Reagan was tough on communism, calling the USSR the “evil
empire,” etc. During this period a portion of the elite, as well as the public, likely continued
their contrasting associations of we=good and the US=democracy=dangerous.
Adding to the resiliency of Russians’ association between the US and democracy is their
nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Davis describes nostalgia as “resulting from comparing the
difficulties of the present to a rather idealized depiction of the past”(Davis 1979). This com-
parison is made to bolster one’s self-esteem because of a difficult time adjusting, following
an abrupt break with the past (Starobinski 1966). Soviet collapse provided the “break with
the past;” Shiraev and Makhovskaya referred to Soviet collapse as “an immeasurable psy-
chological gap between past and present” (Shiraev and Makhovskaya 2007).
Levada polls from at least 2000, 2004 and 2005, show that the majority of Russians
(as well as Ukrainians and Belorussians) agreed with the statement “it’s a disaster that the
Soviet Union no longer exists” (White 2010). A 2008 survey of Russian and Ukrainian
cities also found a wide-spread sentiment that the dissolution of the USSR was a bad thing
(Nikolayenko 2008) and a 2009 Levada poll shows 60% of Russians “deeply regret” Soviet
demise (Weir 2009). Many still identified as Soviet citizens (Levada 2005). In addition,
a 2011 Pew poll shows that most respondents thought “caring about others,” “standard of
living,” “public morality,” and “people getting along” have all declined since Soviet collapse
(Pew 2011). Sullivan produces the following findings:
In terms of feelings of regret over the Soviet collapse, only 3% of all respon-
dents said they were “happy that the USSR no longer exists,” while 22% stated
that they “do not regret the collapse of the Soviet Union.” By comparison, 58%
expressed feelings of regret, with 26% saying that they “strongly regret” the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In terms of feelings of pride and shame towards
the USSR, 53% said that they are proud, while just 2% feel ashamed. A con-
siderable 38% stated that they are “neither proud nor ashamed of the Soviet
Union,” though this amount did not eclipse the 39% who remain “proud” of the
USSR today. Overall, my survey results displayed here indicate that a majority
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of Russia’s citizens harbor feelings of “reflective” nostalgia pertaining to the
Soviet Union.
Sullivan notes that high levels of pride and low levels of shame are consistent with
nostalgia—focusing on the positive memories. His research ultimately shows that the cen-
tral factor in Soviet nostalgia is the welfare state, and that most Russians do not support
a restoration of the USSR. However, he also notes that “Russians are extremely proud of
two features in particular when it comes to the Soviet past; the victory over Nazi Germany
in the Second World War, and the Soviet Union’s ensuing attainment of superpower sta-
tus,” and that people “appear to utilize the memory of the Great Patriotic War along with
the Soviet Union’s superpower status to build up their confidence as they contend with the
uncertainties in their lives today.” It is likely that positively thinking back to the Soviet
Union’s superpower status also entails a negative automatic association with the opposing
superpower—the democratic United States. Nostalgia and resilient attitudes also explain
the significant minority of Russians who blame the US for the collapse of the USSR—28%
in 2014 (Moscow Times 2014).
While nostalgia is likely fading, a socially resilient Soviet identity explains the increas-
ingly positive views of the USSR in recent years. A December 2013 Gallup poll shows the
majority of people in former Soviet states (including Russia) saying more harm than good
came from the Soviet breakup (Gallup 2013). In addition, a recent Levada poll showed
that the majority of Russians said the economy should be based on “government planning
and allocation” (only 27% chose “private property and market relations”)(Moscow Times
2015). Thus, the Soviet identity remains resilient, and an important part of the Soviet iden-
tity is pride in being a superpower, which comes with the association of the United States
as the democratic “other.”
Social modernization via the US
Socially, the Soviet Union was not a modern society (at least not relative to the
West). Inglehart and Welzel define the social aspect of modernization as the change from
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“survival values” to “self-expression values”—self expression values being defined as “so-
cial toleration, life satisfaction, public expression and an aspiration to liberty” (Inglehart and
Welzel 2005). Mazaar consolidates this to an expansion of social choice, noting that tradi-
tional social institution is often a religion, though he also includes “secular faiths” like com-
munism and fascism—the social institutions of which similarly dictate that opting-out is not
okay (Mazar 2007). In the USSR social/political choices were limited and there was one
“traditional” authority—the communist party. Referring to the nature of low-level Soviet
government and the social networks formed to compensate for its incompetence, Richard
Rose even argued that the Soviet legacy made 1990s Russia an “anti-modern” society (Rose
2001). Rose argues that Russian society was “permeated by government failure, in which
formal organizations do not operate impersonally, predictably, and according to the rule of
law.” This forced people to operate through informal social networks, which lack written
rules, full time employees, etc.—characteristic of pre-industrial societies. Rose also ties his
argument into social modernization as discussed by Welzel and Inglehart, and Mazaar—
arguing that informal networks should coalesce into political parties with the growth of
social trust, providing more choice (Rose 2001).
While much of what Rose describes has dramatically improved in the 2000s, Russia
remains socially un-modern relative to the West. White et al. found that even in the late
2000’s, the majority of Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians “seldom” or “never” identify
as European (White, McAllister and Feklyunina 2010)—implying a separate identity and
values from the West. This is important because people living in less socially modern soci-
eties tend to hold more undemocratic, socially un-modern, and anti-choice opinions, e.g. in
surveys they show less tolerance of religious diversity, are more in favor of arranged mar-
riages, register lower evaluations of democracy, etc.6 More “traditional” views continue to
form the identity of many more Russians than Westerners.
Democracy too brings more choice, and is included in the idea of social modernization
(this is consistent with the Kremlin’s recent promotion of socially anti-modern “traditional
6 This can be seen in Pew and World Values Survey country data.
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values”). Moreover, socially modernizing influences (those resulting in more choice) often
come from, and are associated with, America. Indeed it is American culture that is most
prevalent around the world. TV shows from the US are broadcast around the world—
in a 2006 survey of 20 countries, 7 of the top 10 most watched shows were American
(BBC 2006). American movies often dominate cinemas—sometimes to the point where
the US asks countries to reduce their screening quotas of American movies during free
trade negotiations (Congressional Research Service 2014; Wagner 2007). American music
remains extremely popular—just Elvis Presley and Michael Jackson have together sold
over a billion albums, many of them abroad. In addition, the “top brands” as ranked by
business week based on recognizability, sales abroad, etc. are American. Brands like Coca-
Cola, McDonald’s, IBM, Apple, Microsoft, GE, Intel, Marlboro and Disney make up most
of the biggest brands in the world (Businessweek 2007). As a result people see not just
modernization, but also the United States.
Operational conditioning in the early 1990s
The third reason Russians associate the US and democracy is due to a painful
experience with US-associated “democracy” following Soviet collapse. The Russian re-
formers of the early 1990s are often referred to as “Westernizers” (note the word itself
associates Western political entities with liberal democracy), and are associated with the
US. Tsygankov summed up the views of Russia’s Westernizers as “Russia is part of the
West and should integrate with Western economic and political institutions: the main threat
to Russia’s identity come from non-democratic states.” Wagnsson wrote that the Russian
leaders at the time “argued that they had no part in the evils of the Cold War, as the Soviet
leaders had, but were part of the global, democratic community which had contributed to
ending the confrontation” (Wagnsson 2000). The Russians set exceedingly amicable ex-
pectations of their relations with the West and for democracy, likely resulting in a strong
negative association when those years turned out to be so difficult for most Russians.
The tenure of Russia’s Westernizers was accompanied by political, economic, and social
modernization—shocks to society which were associated with the West, and specifically the
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US. While the problems of transition were overwhelmingly Russian, the US was associated
via guidance from people like Lawrence Summers and Andrei Schleifer (Wedel 2006), via
being the ideological center of capitalism and democracy-promotion, and via the arrival of
American products, e.g. McDonald’s, American movies, etc.
In addition, Glinski and Reddaway write that the association with the West
was particularly visible during the stormy confrontation between the Kremlin
and the parliament in the fall of 1993, when the image of a unified “West”
standing behind one of the warring cliques was manipulated, with conscious
support from some powerful Westerners and passive acquiescence from others,
to ensure a winner-take-all victory for one side in the conflict, and to deflect
to “the West” the ultimate responsibility for the consequences of the winner’s
actions (Glinski and Reddaway 1999).
Also, Yeltsin spoke before the US congress in 1992 in which he “effusively praised the
United States for helping Russia slay the dragon of communism (Shiraev and Makhovskaya
2007). Meanwhile, there was disaster in Chechnya, “power sharing agreements” with re-
gional leaders, and a GDP collapse of 40-50% from 1991-1998 (Goldman 2003).
Here the psychological concept of “Operational conditioning” is relevant, it describes
the phenomenon of associating an action with a consequence, and produces an increase in
the frequency and/or strength of a response to a stimulant (Shettleworth 2010). Russians
experienced operational conditioning in the early 1990s—like touching a hot stove. Tsy-
gankov notes that “support for the U.S. model of society fell from 32 percent in 1990 to 13
percent in 1992.” People with “traditional,” Soviet views may have felt proven right when
westernization stumbled in Russia. Even years later, a 2006 survey by the Levada center
showed that given 4 positive evaluations of the word “liberalism,” and 3 negative evalua-
tions, 43% of Russians said they associated the word negatively, with either “Demagoguery
of people in power,” “Wild capitalism,” or “Demagoguery of now-disgraced politicians”
(Ordzhonikidze 2008).
Tsygankov writes that in the early 1990s “as the proposed vision of Westernization
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failed to bring any visible improvements in people’s living standards, the society became
increasingly disillusioned and skeptical. The Soviet collapse critically added to this chang-
ing attitude; many Russians felt that the “talk shop” and the absence of material accom-
plishments were now exacerbated by the significant losses of territory and world status.
The pro-Western Liberal rhetoric was lauded on the surface, but the society had already
begun to withdraw its support for it” (Tsygankov 2004). By 1994, 55% of Russians agreed
that “Russia should take the USSR’s place in the world arena and resist U.S. aspirations for
world dominance” (Wagnsson 2000). The chaos and economic hardship of the 1990s likely
led to cognitive and behavioral attitude formation about democracy and the United States.
According to Tsygankov, Statism, with an emphasis on “national interests,” replaced
Westernism as the hegemonic ideology of Russia in the mid-1990s (Tsygankov 2004) and
by 2001, 53% of Russians viewed the US as an unfriendly state (Tsygankov 2004). Zim-
merman shows that from 1993-1999, the number of Russians perceiving the growth of US
military power as a threat to Russia’s security increased from 46% to 76% (Zimmerman
2009). Tsygankov also notes that the idea of non-Western countries eventually modern-
izing in the manner of Western societies was “criticized by the Russian intellectual and
political spectrum as being insensitive to the Russian domestic context, and even aimed at
perpetuating and expanding Western hegemony” (Wagnsson 2000). While it may not be
clear whether public opinion, elites, or both had primary agency, concerns about the US
were increasing, and a negative experience with “democracy” was had.
Rose et al. write “Russians’ experience with Western-promoted democracy during the
1990s—including the scores of ephemeral and ineffective political parties, a president and
Duma that bickered constantly as the economy collapsed and the Russian Federation frag-
mented, corrupt privatization and oligarchic penetration of the state—in fact discredited
democracy as a feasible system of government for Russia” (Rose and Munro 2011). Some
Russians likely took away an association of democracy=US=bad. A recent Pew poll shows
61% of Russians approved changing to a multi-party system in 1991, while only 50% ap-
proved the change in 2011 (Pew 2011).
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Kremlin motives regarding US-democracy association
As long as the US is viewed negatively, it is in the interest of the Russian elite to
link the US and democracy. The Kremlin seems to do this through the media. The percep-
tion of prevalent opinions in a social group is often formed by repetitive social messaging,
especially by the media—another words, classical conditioning. Kreps notes
The perspectives that emerge in the media have an impact on each country’s
foreign and domestic policies, and on the decisions of its president or leader
... the media are also known to greatly influence the views of the masses.
The opportunity for ordinary people, even in free countries, to shape their own
image of foreign countries is quite limited, particularly in the case of countries
that are separated by great distances (Kreps 1985).
In Russia, a large part of news consumption is through television, which is controlled by
the government. Thus the media’s influence can be guided by Russian elites where negative
views of the US and democracy are reinforced, e.g. in reference to Russian elections and
the US in 2007, Putin was broadcast saying “we will not allow anyone to poke their snotty
nose into our affairs”(Levy 2007).
In addition, Golunov writes “initially, the resurgence of state-promoted patriotic up-
bringing in Russia was aimed at raising the cultural level of young people and morally
preparing future military conscripts. From the start, this resurgence had a strong anti-liberal
and anti-Western flavor (Golunov 2011). As long as people view the US negatively, the
regime has some incentive to reinforce the association between the US and democracy. It
seems to be doing so, as well as promoting a positive image of China.
America Associating Itself with Democracy
The accurate information Russians receive about US foreign policy, e.g. from
the internet7 , has also contributed to an association between the US and democracy. Part
7 most Russians actively use the internet (ITU 2013; RIA Novosti 2013), increasingly reading foreign
viewpoints—the second-most popular internet search in Russia, in 2014, was the conflict in Ukraine (EWDN
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of this is the US using democracy to describe itself, which has been internalized by Rus-
sians. Another part is American democracy promotion. The US is the largest spender on
democracy promotion. The EU is a major democracy-promoter as well, but there is a differ-
ence in approach. Compared to the US, EU states spend a smaller proportion of their funds
on political opposition, and a larger proportion on economic development. The United
States provides more aid to civil society and political opposition groups (Kopstein 2006;
Carothers 1999). Groups largely funded by the government, like the National Endowment
for Democracy and Freedom House, actively give aid and advice to groups seeking demo-
cratic transition (regime change). The more direct democracy promotion approach of the
US attracts more attention in that country, as well as internationally, associating the US with
democracy.
In addition to associating the US with democracy, American democracy-promotion also
affects people’s views of democracy. This happens directly, for the people in the country in
which the US is promoting democracy, and indirectly by people in other countries evaluat-
ing the results of US efforts. This is what Crescenzi calls learning from outside the dyad
(Crescenzi 2007).
For Russians, US democracy promotion not only associates the US with democracy,
but also invokes the traumatic period of weak government in the 1990s. In addition, US
statements about a “freedom agenda” and “outposts of tyranny,” singling out certain states
while not mentioning deeply autocratic allies like Saudi Arabia, likely reinforces negative
Russian views. The US has also used democracy to frame NATO expansion, the invasion of
Iraq, Colored Revolutions, and the 2008 Georgia War—all of this framing has likely reiter-
ated the Russian association between America and democracy. It has also likely contributed
to a negative perception of both.
Thus, five factors explain Russians’ association of democracy and America; a resilient
identity with the United States as the democratic “other,” social modernization via the US,
an association between the US and early 90s “democracy” in Russia via operational con-
2015).
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ditioning, and both Kremlin and America reinforcement of the association. Given these
factors, my hypothesis is that Russians who indicate a positive perceptions of the US, will
also tend to prefer democracy. In fact, I will show that there is a causal relationship from
Russians’ perception of the US, to their opinions of democracy.
Empirical Strategy
To test the idea that Russians have an association between the US and democracy,
and that their perceptions of the US are determinative of their opinion on democracy, I use
data from Pew Global Polling8 . In Russia Pew worked via Romir, using a probability-based
sample design, via face-to-face survey of adults over 18 years of age. The margin of error
is 3.1% and the survey is 100% representative of Russia’s adult population. I used surveys
for 2002, 2007 and 2012, each with 1002 nationally representative respondents (all of the
other years were missing several key questions/variables important to a proper regression
with views on democracy as the dependent variable)9 . I ran separate logit regressions for
Russia in 2002, 2007 and 2012. Moreover, having data for these three years makes for
robust results because Russians’ evaluation of the US ranges from majority positive (64%
positive) in 2002, to majority negative (44.8% positive) in 2007.
My dependent variable comes from the question: “Some feel that we should rely on a
democratic form of government to solve our country’s problems. Others feel that we should
rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country’s problems. Which comes closer
to your opinion?” The respondent had to choose between a democratic government and
the alternative—with the strong implication being that the alternative is not democratic.
“A ruler with a strong hand” brings to mind a ruler with harsh human rights records, but
with other aspects of “success,” like “maintaining order,” industrializing the country, and
especially military victory. In the Russian context, “a leader with a strong hand” might bring
8 Free to download from http://www.pewglobal.org/category/datasets/
9 Also, I used multiple imputation to fill in occasional instances of missing data.
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to mind Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, or Stalin—but not a democratic government.
Key Independent Variables
My key independent variables are questions indicating perception of the US10 .
However, they do not all show the same thing, as a result there is no multicollinearity in
my regressions11 . The first key variable that indicates a positive perception of the US is
whether someone like American movies, TV, and music. This is indicative of liking social
modernization from the US.
Such social modernization often comes via American media: Yandex, Russia’s largest
search engine created a map showing the three most common words Russians use in their
searches in relation to specific countries. The three most commonly searched words in
connection with the United States were 1. TV series, 2. movie, and 3. American Horror
Story (Gazdyuk and Rozin 2012). In addition, the record for most number of weeks as a
number 1 hit song in Russian history (16 weeks) is “Diamonds” by Rhianna. Table 1 shows
the most popular movies in Russia, and more anecdotally, the most popular TV shows
currently. What Table 1 also shows is that endogineity is not a problem for this variable—it
is plausible that liking American movies, music and TV will cause one to improve their
evaluation of the United States—to make a positive association. However, is not plausible
that preferring democracy to a strong leader will cause people to like Rihanna, or Shrek
Forever After.
10 The exact questions are listed in the Appendix, along with summary statistics
11 The variable with the highest variance inflation factor of all of the variable in all three regressions is 1.82.
The highest correlation between US-related variables in any of my regressions is .36
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Table 1: Popular Media in Russia
Highest grossing movies in The most popular TV series
Russian history 1-20 (BOM 2015) in Russia (RussianSearch 2014)
1. Avatar 1.Sherlock (UK)
2. Pirates of the Caribbean: 2.Games of Thrones (USA)
On Stranger Tides
3. Stalingrad 3. Krik Sovi (RU)
4. Shrek Forever After 4. House (USA)
5. Puss in Boots 5. Friends (USA)
6. Ice Age, Continental Drift 6. Fargo (USA)
7. Ironiya Sudby. Prodolzhenie 7. Breaking Bad (USA)
8. Madagascar 3: 8. Homeland (USA)
Europe’s Most Wanted
9. Transformers: Age of Extinction 9. Seventeen Moments of Spring
(Soviet Union)
10. Transformers: Dark of the Moon 10. Prison Break (USA)
11. Ice Age: Dawn of the Dinosaurs
12. Iron Man 3
13. The Hobbit:
An Unexpected Journey
14. The Avengers
15. The Twilight Saga:
Breaking Dawn - Part 2
16. Alice in Wonderland
17. Madagascar: Escape 2 Africa
18. Maleficent
19. Guardians of the Galaxy
20. Harry Potter and the
Deathly Hallows (Part Two)
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My second key variable is whether someone thinks it is a good thing that US customs
and ideas are spreading to Russia. This is also a social modernization related variable,
which may represent US views on greater availability of choice in society (including free
speech/expression and political choice). It is also contrasted by questions about the spread
of foreign culture and influence not specific to America.
The third key variable is Favorable opinion of the United States, this is an important
attitude to take into account, but it is not an all–encompassing perception of the US12 . This
may be similar to having a favorable attitude of a rock star, which does not mean you want
them to live next door, or trust them to make good moral choices—which are relevant in
evaluating overall perception. I take two things into account regarding the potential en-
dogineity. of this variable: 1. I include variables for the opinion of other countries in my
regressions, including liberal democracies like the UK, Germany, France, etc. as well as
the EU (unlike favorable opinion of the US, none of these are correlated with Russians’
preference for democracy) 2. I argue that shocks which greatly decrease how favorably
Russians view the US (but should not affect what form of government Russians think is
best) are accompanied by major drops in Russians’ opinion of democracy. Perhaps the best
example of this is the effect of the conflict in Ukraine from 2014-2015. Ukraine looms
large in the minds of Russians, who have a long and deep connection with the country. The
Russian perspective on the matter seems to be that the US helped overthrow a democrat-
ically elected president, resulting in additional purging of political representation of those
in Eastern Ukraine. As a result, favorable opinion of the US, and of democracy plummeted
between 2014 and 2015. Specifically, there was a 30 percentage point (roughly 69%) de-
crease in favorable opinion of the US (Levada Center 2015b) and a 10 percentage point (a
roughly 50%) decrease in support for democracy (Levada Center 2015a). It is not feasible
that the events in Ukraine over the past year and half were coincidently a time where a large
part of the population reconsidered their views on the best for of government (for which
there was not a major stimulating event). The causality was that a decreased perception of
12 The US-related variables are each informative in and of themselves. Moreover, the US-related variables
taken together only weakly explain “favorable opinion of the US.”
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the US led to a decrease in the opinion of democracy.
The fourth key variable (present only in 2007) is whether the respondent thinks the US
is spreading democracy where ever it can, or where ever it serves its interests. This may
indicate whether the person views the US as a benevolent actor. This variable also avoids
endogeneity as it is not plausible that whether people prefer democracy determines their
opinion on the specific tactics of a state—whether it is spreading democracy everywhere,
or just where it benefits. However, given the association between the US and democracy,
it is reasonable that perception of American spreading of democracy affects how people
perceive the US (and democracy via association). The fifth key variable (present only in
2012) is whether someone approves of Barack Obama’s foreign policy. This is similar to
the fourth key variable, and it also indicates whether the respondent perceives the US as
more or less benevolent.
The sixth key variable (present only in 2012) is whether the respondent thinks that the
2011 protests for fair elections in Russia were genuine, or Western efforts to destabilize
Russia. This variable represents whether the respondent views the US as nefarious. Again,
endogeneity is not an issue as it is not plausible that whether someone prefers democracy
causes them to assign American motives to an event. These six factors are the available
questions from Pew that are related to the US, and they represent the respondents’ percep-
tion of the US.
Control Variables
Scholars analyzing support for democracy have theorized about several factors,
most of which I have incorporated in my model as well. Several authors have argued that
increasing wealth is correlated with increased support for democracy (Mishler and Rose
2001; Magalhaes 2014; Norris 1999), thus I use a variable for income. Inglehart argues a
similar point—that as wealth grows, people transition to “self–expression” values (Inglehart
2003). Self-expression values are social modernization, which entail greater social choice
(including political choice). Thus, I include variables accounting for social modernization,
i.e. whether the person prefers more social choice or less. Like other authors, I also include
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variables for age—perhaps especially relevant in Russia, where different generations were
raised under very different governments, education—typically thought to be correlated with
a relative preference for democracy, and urbanity—another idea from modernization (that
as industrialization/development happens, people become more “modern”).
Per the work of Magalhaes, I also include a measure of for corruption. I use a respon-
dent’s answer on how often they give bribes in 2002 and 2007. In 2012 this question was
not asked, so instead I use the stand-in question “does the following describe your country
well? the existence of law and order.”’ I also include how important the respondent thinks it
is for a democracy to include freedom of speech and the ability to criticize the government,
fair elections, and a judicial system that treats everyone the same. These are important as
people sometimes have different ideas about the specifics of democracy. Finally, I have a
control variable for whether the person believes that they live in a democracy—most Rus-
sians do not. Pew data shows that in 2002, 2007 and 2012, respectively, 16.7%, 18.2%, and
17.4% of respondents thought that “honest elections are held regularly with a choice of at
least two political parties” described Russia very well. In addition, a 2012 RIA Novosti poll
showed that just 8% of Russians believe “democracy exists in today’s Russia” (RIA News
2012). This shows consistency between our understanding of democracy, and that of most
Russians.
Results
Below, my statistical analysis supports the idea that people associate the Unite
States with democracy. It also supports the idea that Russians’ change in perception of the
US causes a change in their view of democracy. I begin with a logit regression of Pew data
for Russia in 2002, presented in Table 2.
Logit Results for 2002
Table 2 shows the logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2002.
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Table 2: 2002 Regression Results
Russia 2002, N=1002 Odds Ratio Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.009 0.0001 ***
Agree? Our way of life needs protection from foreigners 0.746 0.0069 **
Agree? Religion is personal, should separate from govt. 1.399 0.0247 *
Agree? Consumerism and commercialism threaten our culture 0.729 0.0831
Good? globalization 0.891 0.3399
Y/N? I like American music, movies and television 1.816 0.0049 **
Good? Foreign movies, TV, music available in Russia 0.910 0.4866
Good? Increasing international trade 1.078 0.6647
Good? faster communication/travel between Russia/countries 1.239 0.2495
Good? Increased availability of products from abroad 0.947 0.6953
Good? “American ideas and customs are spreading here” 1.538 0.0403 *
Favorable opinion of the US 1.445 0.0055 **
Opinion, are there regular/honest elections in Russia? 1.020 0.8315
How often do you give bribes? 1.129 0.1642
Importance of: free speech/ability to criticize the govt? 1.263 0.0653
Importance of: regular/honest elections? 1.306 0.0382 *
Importance of: judicial system treats everyone the same 0.881 0.4956
Age 0.988 0.0653
Education 1.157 0.0657
Income 1.002 0.0625
How urban is your area of residence? 0.708 0.0997
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First, note that liking American movies, music and TV is positively and statistically
significantly correlated with a preference for democracy over a leader with a strong hand.
However, note that there is not a statistically significant correlation between a person’s
evaluation of “the way movies, TV and music from different parts of the world are now
available in Russia” and their preference for democracy or a leader with a strong hand. This
supports the idea that Russians strongly associate specifically America with Democracy. In
fact, the odds ratios indicates that someone that likes American movies, TV, and music is
81% more likely to prefer democracy than someone who doesn’t.
Second, note that the positive and statistically significant correlation between people
positively evaluating “American ideas and customs are spreading here” and a preference
for democracy. There is a 53% higher chance that someone approves of the spread of US
ideas and customs also prefers democracy. Also, note the lack of correlation for the vari-
ables evaluating increased international trade, communication, travel, and the availability
of foreign goods. The variable noting whether people believe their way of life needs to
be protected from foreign influence is significant and negative, but US ideas still stand out
as statistically significant correlations, while foreign influence is mostly not relevant13 .
Favorable views of the US are also correlated with preference for democracy which is con-
sistent with the outlined theory. Figure 1 is a plot of predicted probabilities for statistically
significant variables related to the United States.
13 There is correlation between social modernization (“self-expression”) variables, and preference for
democracy as Modernization Theory would predict. Specifically the preference for religious freedom, and
not thinking that “our way of life needs to be protected from foreigners.” However, there is not a statistically
significant correlation between income and preference for democracy. In fact, running similar regressions on
dozens of country-years I do find a correlation between the GDP of a country and the percent of its people
that preferred democracy. However, this relationship is not statistically significant on an individual level.
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Fig. 1: Holding all other variables at their mean, the probability that a Russian prefers democracy in
2002, as opposed to “a leader with a ’strong hand”’
1=US culture spreading to Russia
2=US movies, music and TV show
3=Opinion of the United States
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Logit Results for 2007
Table 3 shows the logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2007.
Table 3: 2007 Regression Results
Russia 2007, N=1002 Odds Ratio Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.014 0.0000 ***
Good? increasing trade with other countries 0.943 0.5913
Agree? Our way of life needs protection from foreigners 0.905 0.3082
Good? “American ideas and customs are spreading here” 1.972 0.0021 **
Y/N? I like American music, movies and television 1.416 0.0414 *
Should boys education be prioritized over that of girls? 0.625 0.0537
Good? arranged marriage 0.743 0.0322 *
Agree? Religion is personal, should separate from govt. 1.411 0.0024 **
Opinion, is US democracy promotion, cynical? 1.887 0.0033 **
Opinion of the US 1.211 0.0372 *
Opinion of France 0.827 0.2031
Opinion of Japan 1.088 0.3964
Opinion, are there regular/honest elections in Russia? 0.890 0.1593
How often do you give bribes? 1.053 0.5212
Importance of: free speech/ability to criticize the govt? 1.652 0.0000 ***
Importance of: regular/honest elections? 1.176 0.1736
Importance of: judicial system treats everyone the same 0.825 0.1760
Age 0.999 0.8804
Education 1.187 0.0047 **
Income 1.000 0.7988
There four things to note. First, believing “The United States promotes democracy
wherever it can” as opposed to “the United States promotes democracy mostly where it
serves its interests,” is positively and statistically significantly correlated with preferring
democracy over a leader with a strong hand. Second, the favorable view of the United
States variable is again positively and statistically significantly correlated with preference
of democracy, consistent with my theory. Moreover, opinions of other countries are not
correlated with opinion of democracy. Note that the a favorable opinion of France and
Japan is not statistically significant (I also tried Germany and the UK, the other two
Western countries for which there is data, and they too were not correlated with preference
for democracy at a statistically significant level of .05).
The third and fourth important indicators to note in the 2007 regression are that “I
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like American music, movies and television” (as opposed to dislike) and a positive
assessment of “American ideas and customs are spreading here” are both positively and
statistically significantly correlated with a preference for democracy. These choices go
along with a 42% and an 98% higher chance, respectively, of preferring democracy. This
despite other social modernization variables not being statistically significant, specifically
the evaluation of increasing trade, and whether one believes their way of life needs to be
protected from foreign influence. Figure 2 is a plot of predicted probabilities for
statistically significant variables related to the United States.
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Fig. 2: Holding all other variables at their mean, the probability that a Russian prefers democracy in
2007, as opposed to “a leader with a ’strong hand”’
1=Motive attributed to US democracy promotion
2=US movies, music and TV show
3=US customs and ideas spreading to Russia
4=Opinion of the United States
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Logit Results for 2012
Table 3 shows the logit regression of Pew data for Russia in 2012.
Table 4: 2012 Regression Results
Russia 2012 Odds Ratio Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 0.036 0.0001
Good? “American ideas and customs are spreading here” 1.631 0.0073 **
Y/N? I like American music, movies and television 1.632 0.0027 **
Agree? protests for fair elections were genuine? (as opposed to
“Western efforts to destabilize Russia”) 1.442 0.0252 *
Favorable opinion of the US 1.309 0.0083 **
Favorable opinion of Iran 1.010 0.9155
Favorable opinion of the EU 0.902 0.3499
Favorable opinion of Turkey 1.069 0.4872
Approve? “International policies of President Barak Obama” 1.688 0.0008 ***
Opinion, are there regular/honest elections in Russia? 0.989 0.9027
Opinion, is law and order well maintained in Russia? 1.120 0.1688
Importance of: free speech/ability to criticize the govt? 1.0909 0.4524
Importance of: regular/honest elections? 1.177 0.2153
Importance of: judicial system treats everyone the same 0.985 0.9115
Age 1.001 0.8793
Education 1.034 0.6395
Income 1.000 0.1073
How urban is your area of residence? 1.096 0.0255 *
The first thing to note in Table 3 is the positive and statistically significant
correlation between preference for democracy and belief that recent protests for fair
elections were genuine, as opposed to “Western efforts to destabilize Russia.” Believing
the protests are not Western efforts means a 44% higher chance of preferring democracy.
This is another indication of association between US and democracy—the more people
view democracy as a cynical tool of the US, the less they like it.
The second thing to note is that approval of “the international policies of President
Barak Obama” is positively and statistically significantly correlated with preference of
democracy. Approving of America’s foreign policy means a 69% higher probability of
preferring democracy. The third and fourth things to note are that “I like American music,
movies and television” and a positive assessment of “American ideas and customs are
spreading here” are both positively and statistically significantly correlated with a
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preference for democracy. Each corresponding to a higher likelihood of preferring
democracy of 63%. Unfortunately the Pew 2012 survey did not have a close match to a
generic question about the spread of foreign culture in 2012 for contrast, though the results
are still consistent with there being a causal relationship between perception of the US and
preference for democracy. Finally, there is again a positive and statistically significant
correlation between favorable view of the US and democracy consistent with my theory.
Moreover, there is not a statistically significant relationship between preference for
democracy and opinion of other countries or the EU14 . These results indicate that
perception of the US causally affects Russians’ evaluation of democracy. Figure 3 is a plot
of predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables related to the United States.
14 I chose Turkey and Iran as confirmation of the consistency of my results, because they are not traditionally
considered part of the West, nor do they do not pose a military threat to Russia for which respondents could
prefer a “strong hand.”
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Fig. 3: Holding all other variables at their mean, the probability that a Russian prefers democracy in
2012, as opposed to “a leader with a ’strong hand”’
1=US role in Russian protests
2=US movies, music and TV show
3=US customs and ideas spreading to Russia
4=Barak Obama’s International Policies
5=Opinion of the United States
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Conclusion
My analysis shows how and why Russians have formed an association between the
US and democracy. This happened because of their resilient Soviet identity (including
nostalgia), due to social modernization emanating from the US, conditioning via a poor
experience with US–associated “democracy” in the early 1990s, as well as Kremlin and
US reinforcement of the US=democracy association. Moreover, my analysis shows that
this association has a causal effect—Russians adjust their opinion of democracy based on
their perception of the United States. This is a new idea, and it reveals a factor that are
important in determining Russians’ opinion of democracy.
In addition to contributing to democratization theory, this causal association
between the US and democracy also has policy implications: while the US is certainly not
to blame for Russia’s problems, how it is perceived matters. For example, when Hillary
Clinton says (in regard to Ukraine) “Now if this sounds familiar, it’s what Hitler did back
in the ’30s” (Rucker 2014). This is not simply inaccurate, it worsens perceptions of the US
because most Russians have relatives that suffered or died defeating Hitler’s armies. Given
that Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings have not fallen below 61% since 2000, personal
attacks on him by American officials (Like Joe Biden saying he told Putin that he has no
soul) also likely worsen Russians’ perception of the US. But Such incidents don’t only
worsen Russians’ opinion of the US, they also reduce Russians’ support for democracy.
Perhaps a better approach, one that the average Russia is more likely to get behind, would
be to focus on government accountability and a fair election process.
Also, given that there is an 89% higher chance that a Russian who thinks the US is
spreading democracy because it’s a good thing to do, is likely to prefer democracy over a
leader with a “strong hand,” we should be careful that our democracy promotion not look
very biased. American methods of democracy promotion in certain places should even be
re-thought—they may be perceived by the public in general as a nefarious effort, and thus
be counter-productive. Furthermore, issue–framing by elites in non-democratic countries
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is made easier when US-related democratization looks bad. Theodor Gerber puts it well,
“Although U.S. policymakers cannot control the Kremlin’s rhetoric, they can reverse
policies that undermine the international image of the United States as a guarantor of
human rights norms and as an alternative to authoritarian regimes around the world”
(Mendelson and Gerber 2008). Selective criticism of autocrats, refusing to join
international bans on mines and cluster-bombs, water-boarding, reduced interpersonal
contact with unfriendly states, the linking of our military operations with democracy, and
unnecessary insults, all have an impact on the way the US is perceived, and hence, on the
prospects of democratization—at least in Russia. A deeper consideration of how the US is
perceived in Russia can increase demand for democracy there. Moreover, if the
relationship I described, between perception of the US and opinion of democracy is true in
Russia, it may be true in other places as well15 .
APPENDIX
In the Logit estimates below darker lines represent one standard deviation and lighter lines
represent two standard deviations.
15 I also ran regressions for 75 other country-years, most countries do not have the correlation between
opinion of democracy and variables related to perception of the US. My hunch is that this is because people in
those countries do not have the same degree of psychological association between democracy and the United
States. This should be considered in future research.
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Fig. 4: Logit estimates for 2002
2002 Logit Estimates
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Education
Income
How Urban
Good? More international trade
Good? easier access to abroad
Good? more foreign products
Good? US ideas spreading here
Fig. 5: Logit estimates for 2007
2007 Logit Estimates
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Good? More international trade
Way of life protection/foreigners
Religion separate from govt.
Good? US ideas spreading here
Like US movies, music, TV
US democarcy promotion is good
Marriage arranged more by fam
Honest elections in Russia
Frequencey give bribes
Age
Education
Income
Fav opinion of the US
Fav opinion of the Japan
Fav opinion of France
prioritize boys education?
Importance of free speech
Importance of honest elections
Importance of fair judiciary
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Fig. 6: Logit estimates for 2012
2012 Logit Estimates
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Fav opinion of the US
Fav opinion of the Iran
Fav opinion of the EU
Fav opinion of the Turkey
Good? US ideas spreading here
Like US movies, music, TV
Honest elections in Russia
Existance of law and order
Age
Education
Income
How Urban
Protests in Russia are legit.
Obama's int. policy is good
Importance of free speech
Importance of honest elections
Importance of fair judiciary
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Table 5: 2002 Variable Statistics
Question % first statement % second statement
Which comes closer to your view?
Consumerism and commercialism are a
threat to our culture, OR consumerism
and commercialism are not a threat to
our culture. 46 54
Which is closer to describing your view?
I like American music, movies and
television, OR I dislike American music,
movies and television. 47 54
Which of the following phrases comes
closer to your view? It’s good that
American ideas and customs are
spreading here, OR it’s bad that
American ideas and customs are
spreading here. 21 80
(Does the interviewee live in an Urban
location, or a rural location?) 74 26
Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
What do you think about the
growing trade and business ties
between (survey country) and
other countries —do you think
it is a very good thing, somewhat
good, somewhat bad or a very
bad thing for our country? 2 6 65 28
And what about the faster
communication and greater travel
between the people of (survey
country) and people in other
countries—do you think this is a
very good thing, somewhat good,
somewhat bad or a very bad thing
for our country? 1 6 65 29
And what about the different
products that are now available
from different parts of the world
—do you think this is a very
good thing, somewhat good,
somewhat bad or a very bad thing
for our country? 4 14 60 23
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Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
There has been a lot of talk about
globalization these days. Do you
think that globalization is a very
good thing, somewhat good,
somewhat bad or a very bad thing? 11 22 60 8
Please tell me whether you
completely agree, mostly agree,
mostly disagree or completely
disagree with this statement.
Religion is a matter of personal
faith and should be kept separate
from government policy. 1 4 39 57
Please tell me whether you
completely agree, mostly agree,
mostly disagree or completely
disagree with this statement. Our
way of life needs to be protected
against foreign influence. 5 16 46 32
Here is a list of things that you
can and cannot do in some
countries. How important is it to
you to live in a country where
(INSERT)? Is it very important,
somewhat important, not too
important or not important at all?
you can openly say what you think
and can criticize the (state/
government) 5 15 47 33
Here is a list of things that you
can and cannot do in some
countries. How important is it to
you to live in a country where
(INSERT)? Is it very important,
somewhat important, not too
important or not important at all?
honest elections are held
regularly with a choice of at least
two political parties 5 15 41 40
Here is a list of things that you
can and cannot do in some
countries. How important is it to
you to live in a country where
(INSERT)? Is it very important,
somewhat important, not too
important or not important at all?
there is a judicial system that
treats everyone in the same way 1 2 26 72
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Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
What about the way movies, TV
and music from different parts
of the world are now available in
(survey country) —do you think
this is a very good thing,
somewhat good, somewhat bad
or a very bad thing for our
country? 10 32 45 14
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of (INSERT)?
The United States 8 30 55 8
Does (INSERT) describe our
country very well, somewhat
well, not too well or not well at
all? honest elections are held
regularly with a choice of at least
two political parties 14 25 45 17
Question never not at not too Somewhat very
all often often often
In the past year, how often, if ever,
have you had to do a favor, give a
gift or pay a bribe to a government
official in order to get services or a
document that the government is
supposed to provide—very often,
somewhat often, not too often,
not at all?
% of respondents per category: 10 54 22 10 5
Question Min Median Mean Max St. dev
How old were you at your last birthday?
% of respondents per category: 18 43 44.01 79 15.64
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Question No Some Complete Some Complete Some Univ.
formal primary primary secondary secondary univ. with
edu. school school school school degree
What is
the highest
level of
education
that you
have
completed?
% of
respondents
per category: 0 1 4 15 55 5 21
Question: 750 1750 2500 3500 5000 7000 9000 12500 17500
Here is a list of
incomes. Which
of these does
your household
fall into
counting all
wages, salaries,
pensions and
other incomes
that come in?
Just give the
letter of the
group your
household falls
into, before
taxes and other
deductions.
Percent of
respondents
per category
(income in
rubles): 13 13 21 17 18 10 6 3 1
(N=1002)
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Table 6: 2007 Variable Statistics
Question % first statement % second statement
Which of the following phrases
comes closer to your view? It’s
good that American ideas and
customs are spreading here, OR
it’s bad that American ideas and
customs are spreading here. 15 85
Which is closer to describing your
view? I like American music, movies
and television, OR I dislike American
music, movies and television. 40 60
And which comes closer to describing
your view? The United States
promotes democracy wherever it
can, OR the United States promotes
democracy mostly where it serves
it’s interests? 13 87
Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
Here is a list of things that you can
and cannot do in some countries.
How important is it to you to live in
a country where (INSERT)? Is it very
important, somewhat important, not
too important or not important at all?
there is a judicial system that treats
everyone in the same way 1 5 25 71
Question % first % second % second
statement statement statement
Which one of the following statements comes
closest to your opinion about educating
children? 1. It is more important for boys than
for girls 2. It is more important for girls than
for boys 3. It is equally important for boys
and girls 6 91 4
Do you think a woman should choose her
own husband, or do you think it is better for
a woman’s family to choose her husband?
(the respondent could also volunteer “both”) 71 4 26
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Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
What do you think about the
growing trade and business ties
between (survey country) and
other countries —do you think
it is a very good thing, somewhat
good, somewhat bad or a very
bad thing for our country? 2 11 55 32
As I read another list of
statements, for each one, please
tell me whether you completely
agree, mostly agree, mostly
disagree or completely disagree
with it. Religion is a matter of
personal faith and should be kept
separate from government policy. 2 9 32 58
As I read another list of
statements, for each one, please
tell me whether you completely
agree, mostly agree, mostly
disagree or completely disagree
with it. Our way of life needs to
be protected against foreign
influence. 3 15 38 45
I am going to read you the same
list. Does (read from list below)
describe our country very well,
somewhat well, not too well or
not well at all? honest elections
are held regularly with a choice
of at least two political parties 13 27 43 18
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? The United States 20 36 36 9
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? Japan 3 17 61 19
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? France 1 11 67 22
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Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
Here is a list of things that you
can and cannot do in some
countries. How important is it
to you to live in a country
where (INSERT)? Is it very
important, somewhat
important, not too important
or not important at all? you
can openly say what you
think and can criticize the
(state/government) 4 16 47 34
Here is a list of things that
you can and cannot do in
some countries. How
important is it to you to live in
a country where (INSERT)? Is it
very important, somewhat
important, not too important
or not important at all? honest
elections are held regularly
with a choice of at least two
political parties 3 13 43 41
Question never not at not too Somewhat very
all often often often
In the past year, how often, if ever,
have you had to do a favor, give a
gift or pay avbribe to a government
official in order to get services or a
document that the government is
supposed to provide—very often,
somewhat often, not too often, not
at all? Percent of respondents per
category: 10 55 20 10 5
Question Min Median Mean Max St. dev
How old were you at your last birthday?
% of respondents per category: 18 45 46.32 99 18.78
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Question No Some Complete Some Complete Some Univ.
formal primary primary secondary secondary univ. with
edu. school school school school degree
What is
the highest
level of
education
that you
have
completed?
% of
respondents
per category: 1 4 8 30 32 6 21
Question: 750 1750 2500 3500 5000 7000 9000 12500 17500 24000
Here is a list
of incomes.
Which of
these does
your
household
fall into
counting all
wages,
salaries,
pensions
and other
incomes
that come
in? Just give
the letter of
the group
your
household
falls into,
before taxes
and other
deductions.
Percent of
respondents
per category
(income in
rubles): 4 3 14 12 15 13 14 12 7 8
(N=1002)
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Table 7: 2012 Variable Statistics
Question % first statement % second statement
Which of the following phrases comes
closer to your view? It’s good that
American ideas and customs are
spreading here, OR it’s bad that
American ideas and customs are
spreading here. 24 77
Which is closer to describing your
view? I like American music, movies
and television, OR I dislike American
music, movies and television. 54 47
Some people say the protests for fair
elections are the result of efforts by
Western powers to destabilize Russia.
Others say the protests are the result
of genuine Russian dissatisfaction
with the conduct of the elections.
Which comes closer to your view? 31 70
Overall, do you approve or
disapprove of the international policies
of President Barak Obama? 37 64
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Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? The United States. %
of respondents per category: 12 30 47 12
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? Iran % of
respondents per category: 13 38 41 8
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? The EU. Percent of
respondents per category: 5 20 62 14
Please tell me if you have a very
favorable, somewhat favorable,
somewhat unfavorable or very
unfavorable opinion of
(INSERT)? Turkey. Percent of
respondents per category: 11 24 54 12
I am going to read you the
same list. Does (INSERT)
describe our country very well,
somewhat well, not too well or
not well at all? honest elections
are held regularly with a choice
of at least two political parties.
% of respondents per category: 15 30 38 18
I am going to read you the
same list. Does (INSERT)
describe our country very well,
somewhat well, not too well
or not well at all? law and
order is maintained % of
respondents per category: 25 33 24 19
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Question Strongly Somewhat Somewhat Strongly
negative negative positive positive
Here is a list of things that you
can and cannot do in some
countries. How important is it
to you to live in a country
where (INSERT)? Is it very
important, somewhat
important, not too important
or not important at all? you
can openly say what you
think and can criticize the
(state/government) % of
respondents per category: 3 9 43 46
Here is a list of things that you
can and cannot do in some
countries. How important is it
to you to live in a country
where (INSERT)? Is it very
important, somewhat
important, not too important
or not important at all? honest
elections are held regularly
with a choice of at least two
political parties. % of
respondents per category: 3 7 37 54
Here is a list of things that
you can and cannot do in
some countries. How
important is it to you to live in
a country where (INSERT)? Is it
very important, somewhat
important, not too important
or not important at all? there
is a judicial system that treats
everyone in the same way. %
of respondents per category: 1 5 23 72
Question Min Median Mean Max St. dev
How old were you at your last birthday?
% of respondents per category: 18 41 43.05 87 16.90
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Question Rural Town City City City City
<50k 50–100k 100–500k .5m–1m >1m
[Urbanity of respondent] %
of respondents per category: 26 17 8 19 11 20
Question No Some Complete Some Complete Some Univ.
formal primary primary secondary secondary univ. with
edu. school school school school degree
What is
the highest
level of
education
that you
have
completed?
% of
respondents
per category: 0 1 14 23 34 7 28
Question 48 129 194 273 403 645 968 1355
Here is a list of incomes. Which
of these does your household
fall into counting all wages,
salaries, pensions and other
incomes that come in? Just give the
letter of the group your household
falls into, before taxes and other
deductions (2012 USD per month)
% of respondents per category: 1 2 4 15 19 26 15 19
(N=1002)
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